


MEMORANDUM FOR:

ALL NIOs

The attached agenda item for the NIC staff meeting on 16 June is intended as a device to stimulate discussion. It is not meant to exclude other potential warning developments you may wish to raise.

Once a month, I want the NIOs collectively to review a warning agenda. You are encouraged to comment on any item regardless of your respective regional responsibilities. I hope to tap the wide experience and insights of the NIOs as a collective group, not as individual area specialists.




Date 15 June 1982

14 June 1982

Agenda for NIC Warning Meeting: Potentials for Surprise
in the Next Three to Six Months

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II. Iran-Iraq

1. Iran will take full advantage of the impasse over Lebanon to extend its influence in the Arab world and promote its hegemony in the Gulf. The Khomeini regime's prompt recognition of the opening to pose as defender of Syria and the PLO suggests that Tehran believes the Lebanon crisis has made Saddam Hussein even more vulnerable to Iranian military pressure and political subversion. Iran will either invade Iraq in the next two to three months or initiate paramilitary and subversive actions to overthrow Saddam.

2. With the deadlock over Lebanon fueling growing anti-US agitation in the Arab states, Iran will lean even harder on the Gulf regimes to "return to the fold of Islam" and curtail ties with the US. Israel's policy in Lebanon will reduce the ability and willingness of moderate Arab governments to resist Iran's pretensions in the Arab world and to cooperate with the US in containing an expansion of Iranian influence in the Gulf.

III. Falklands Fallout

1. An Argentine military defeat, after a brief period of rallying around the flag and junta, will generate an internal upheaval, radicalization, and reemergence of a mass movement based on labor and Peronist groups.

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2. Failure of the Falklands venture will increasingly alienate Argentina from the West and establish a favorable political climate for growing ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba.

3. Post-Stanley Argentine attempts to maintain a war of attrition against the British fleet and presence on the islands will oblige the Thatcher government to take harsh reprisals, ranging from reimposition of the sea and air blockade through a blockade of Argentine ports to attacks on Argentine airfields.

4. British reprisals will fuel Latin American sentiment for a modified OAS excluding the US. Growing anti-US-UK pressures will make it more difficult for L.A. governments to support US policies in Central America and the Caribbean. These trends will undercut pro-US governments and favor the emergence of military and/or leftist authoritarian regimes hostile to US interests.

5. Shifts in internal and foreign alignments will alter L.A. perceptions of Cuba and Nicaragua and result eventually in Cuba's return to a reorganized OAS. Leftist insurgency movements in Central America will draw strength and credibility from anti-US trends.

IV. Poland

1. The issue of whether to approve the Pope's visit in August will aggravate strains in the military-party relationship. Disagreements would encourage party leaders such as Olszowski to increase opposition to Jaruzelski's steady expansion of the military's role in governing the country.

2. Solidarity and student activists will take advantage of disarray in the regime to organize new demonstrations. Party and police provocateurs will incite incidents in an attempt to force a showdown in the martial law leadership.

3. Growing disorder in Poland will sharpen the Soviets' dilemma at a time when they are preparing for a summit meeting with the US. Moscow will face a choice either to protect its interest in proceeding with the summit by continuing to back Jaruzelski's leadership or to risk the summit by pressing the regime to outlaw Solidarity and other free unions, ban strikes, and move toward restoration of party rule.

V. Namibia

1. Dirk Mudge's 3 May call for elections with or without international supervision and a Cuban withdrawal from Angola signals a major step toward a unilateral "internal settlement." South Africa's declared intention to disengage from Namibia next year implies a coordinated scenario with the Turnhalle Alliance.

2. In the next three to six months, South Africa will intensify attacks on SWAPO bases in Angola and attempt to provoke confrontations with Cuban troops.

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3. The frontline states will be obliged to end discussions with the Western Contact Group and shift to more assertive support for SWAPO and greater reliance on Soviet and Cuban political and military assistance.

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